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ABSTRACT 
We employ a unique framework to quantify the net effect of financial liberalization on banks’ 
total factor productivity (TFP) growth through a decomposition analysis of two effects: a 
positive direct effect of financial liberalization on bank TFP growth; and a negative indirect 
effect operating through a higher propensity to systemic banking crisis. The empirical 
decomposition is based on a sample of 1,530 banks operating in 88 countries over the period 
1999-2011. We find that the net effect of financial liberalization on bank TFP growth is 
positive: the direct positive effect outweighs the negative one. An important policy implication 
flows from these findings.      
 
JEL Classification: G01; G21; G28; G32; D24; E44  
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1.  Introduction 
 Over the past three decades, the world has seen sustained financial liberalization and 
increasing levels of global financial integration and bank competition. As a result of these 
forces, banking sectors worldwide have undergone substantial changes aimed at enhancing 
efficiency and productivity through, for example, implementing more effective organizational 
structures and ‘best practice’ approaches, developing IT infrastructures, introducing new 
financial products and services and, more generally, exploiting more efficient methods of 
capital allocation to reduce intermediation costs (Isik and Hassan, 2003a; Levine, 2001). 
Indeed, much research, albeit mostly based on single-country studies, has documented 
empirically the direct positive effect of financial deregulation on bank productivity growth 
(see, inter alia, Berg et al., 1992; Isik and Hassan, 2003a; Kumbhakar and Lozano-Vivas, 
2005; Nakane and Weintraub, 2005; Tirtiroglu et al., 2005).1  
 Alongside the direct effect of financial liberalization on bank productivity, a separate 
strand of literature has highlighted how the trend of financial liberalization, accompanied by 
greater bank lending and risk taking under more deregulated and internationally diversified 
financial regimes (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1999 and 2002; Gulamhussen et al., 
2014; Fielding and Rewilak, 2015; Caballero, 2016), has led to increased co-dependence in 
default risk of commercial banks around the world, making them more susceptible to 
common exposure to economic, liquidity and information shocks that increase the likelihood 
of a systemic banking crisis (Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2014). Indeed, as recently 
observed by Cubillas and González (2014) in their compelling analysis of the channels 
                                                 
1 But, for mixed findings, see also the studies by Wheelock and Wilson (1999), Mukherjee et al. 
(2001), Alam (2001), Dogan and Fausten (2003), Isik and Hassan (2003b) and Sanyal and Shanker 
(2011).  At cross-country level, there is a paucity of research that investigates the impact of financial 
liberalization (or more generally technological, regulatory or environmental changes) on bank TFP 
growth, mostly reporting positive effects (see Casu et al., 2004; Brissimis et al., 2008; Koutsomanoli-
Filippaki et al., 2009; Delis et al., 2011). 
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through which financial liberalization increases risk taking by banks and affects banks’ 
financial stability, a consensus seems to have emerged around the idea that financial 
liberalization – as a result of all of its multifaceted manifestations ranging from greater 
international diversification to increased co-dependence – is one of the main culprits of the 
higher frequency and intensity of banking crises since the mid-1980s (see also Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999; Mehrez and Kaufmann, 2000; Aka, 2006; Gupta and Karapatakis, 2008; 
Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2008).2  
 Banking crises, in turn, by generating substantive output losses and a wide variety of 
sector-specific and economy-wide inefficiencies, have been found to impact firm productivity 
negatively, including labor productivity, both in the short- and long-term. For example, 
Oulton and Sebastiá-Barriel (2013) argue that since crises impede the reallocation of capital 
from less productive to more productive uses, they hinder the productivity growth of firms.  
Although it can be argued that by eliminating inefficient/unproductive banks crises should 
help raise the overall productivity of the industry, it can also be argued that with the same 
inputs, many banks loose substantial outputs (loan charge offs, depreciated portfolio of 
securities, etc.) during the crises, which may cause bank productivity to decline and, in some 
cases, banks may even fail.3  With such failures, the level of outputs with respect to inputs 
gradually decline.  Millard and Nicolae (2014) highlight, using an endogenous growth model, 
an alternative channel through which a financial shock, by reducing a firm’s capacity to 
innovate via increased cost of borrowing, can permanently hinder its total factor productivity 
(TFP).  Earlier, Isik and Hassan (2003b) demonstrated, using a non-parametric Malmquist 
                                                 
2 But see also Angkinand et al. (2010), Noy (2004) and Menkhoff and Suwanaporn (2007), who find 
that the relationship between financial liberalization and banking crises is mitigated by the 
implementation of institutional reforms and prudential regulation. Majerbi and Rachdi (2014) also 
find that more stringent banking regulation and supervision, better law and order, government 
stability, and lack of corruption and bureaucratic efficiency, generally lower the probability of crises. 
 
3 For evidence showing that inefficient banks are more likely to fail, see, e.g., Wheelock and Wilson 
(1995, 2000). 
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TFP change index, how the Turkish 1994 banking crisis (after financial deregulation in the 
1980s) seriously disrupted its banking sector productivity (and efficiency) through a general 
decline in economic activity which resulted from suppressing bank loans and services to 
households and firms. 
 Despite the widespread acknowledgement that financial liberalization has sometimes 
seemed to cause more problems than it has solved (as epitomized by the title of a well-known 
study by Diaz-Alejandro, 1985, “Good bye financial repression, hello financial crash”), with 
the notable exception of the study by Ranciere et al. (2006), to our knowledge, relevant 
literature has never attempted to integrate the two contrasting views on the impact of 
financial liberalization within a unifying empirical framework capable of gauging the net 
effect. Ranciere et al. (2006) develop an integrated framework to empirically quantify and 
contrast the economy-wide dual effects of financial liberalization on long-term average 
(output) growth on the one hand, and financial crises (defined by the concomitance of a 
banking crisis and a currency crisis) on the other. However, to date, no subsequent study has 
applied this unique methodological framework to investigate the sector-specific 
consequences of financial liberalization for banking business (or any other sector in fact), at 
either single- or cross-country level.   
 Drawing on the novel empirical strategy developed by Ranciere et al. (2006), the 
present study contributes to this literature by decomposing the dual effects of financial 
liberalization on the banking sector. Specifically, we decompose the impact of financial 
liberalization on bank productivity into two contrasting effects: (i) a positive direct effect on 
bank total factor productivity growth; and (ii) a negative indirect effect on bank total factor 
productivity via a higher propensity to a systemic banking crisis (due to greater risk taking, 
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bank risk and financial fragility).4  Whilst these two individual effects (alongside the various 
underlying channels that lead to them) have been already amply investigated and are well 
documented in relevant literature, the attempt to ascertain empirically the net effect – which 
constitutes the central purpose of the present analysis -  has not yet been reported in the 
literature. Our empirical decomposition of the effects of financial liberalization is based on an 
international sample of 1,530 banks operating in 88 countries over the period 1999-2011.  
 The critical innovation inherent in our application of Ranciere et al.'s analytical 
framework lies in our consideration of bank total factor productivity (TFP) growth rather 
than economy-wide output growth.5  There is a purposeful rationale for the choice of this 
specific TFP measure given our interest in the effects of financial liberalization. As noted by 
Fiordelisi and Molyneux (2010), the changing structural landscape of banking systems 
resulting from financial liberalization can be expected to impact on the efficiency and 
productivity of the banking sector. As in the case of an economy-wide system, the capacity of 
the banking sector to supply services depends both on the quantities and qualities of the 
primary inputs into the production process – capital and labor – and on the efficiency with 
which they are combined.6  This concept embeds the notion of TFP, which provides an ideal 
                                                 
4 In broad terms, a systemic banking crisis is said to occur when much or all of the banking capital in 
the country is exhausted, a situation emerging when the total value of the banking system liabilities 
exceeds the value of its assets (see, e.g., Caprio and Klingebiel, 2003; and Honahan and Laeven, 
2005). However, in our empirical analysis, we employ the measure developed by Laeven and 
Valencia (2008; 2012; 2013) according to which systemic banking crises are events in which there are 
both significant signs of  financial distress and significant policy interventions in banking. Whilst 
recognizing that bank risk is exogenously determined while bank risk taking is endogenous (since it 
stems from bank behaviour), the latter can have amplified knock-on effects on the former thereby 
increasing the overall financial fragility of the banking system and expose it to a higher likelihood of 
crises. 
 
5 At an aggregate, economy-wide level, Kose et al. (2009) have also re-directed attention on the value 
of considering the effects of financial openness on TFP growth rather than output growth (see also 
Mishkin, 2006; Bonfiglioli, 2008; Bekaert et al., 2011). We extend this investigative route by 
considering the bank TFP growth indicator as the ideal bank productivity measure. 
 
6 It bears reminding that the original economy-wide measure of TFP growth is based on the Solow 
residual, referred to as that part of output growth that cannot be accounted for by the growth of the 
primary factors of production, i.e., capital and labor.  
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measure to capture the productivity and supply capacity of the banking sector, and how this is 
affected by financial liberalization. Other novel features that distinguish our contribution 
from that by Ranciere et al. (2006) include the adoption of a more comprehensive model that 
caters for both bank specific and country level influences in the estimation of crises and TFP 
growth in addition to using more up-to-date measures of de jure and de facto financial 
liberalization. Moreover, we explicitly control for endogeneity bias in our robustness checks. 
To carry out our investigation we adopt a two-stage empirical approach which 
involves estimating bank TFP growth in the first stage and then assessing the dual effects of 
financial liberalization on bank TFP growth in the second stage.  In estimating bank TFP 
growth, we follow most previous studies in the bank productivity literature by deriving 
Malmquist indices using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) techniques of all the banks 
included in our sample. Then, following the empirical strategy of Ranciere et al. (2006), we 
use a ‘treatment effect’ model to decompose the impact of financial liberalization on bank 
TFP growth into the two effects discussed above.  
 Our results indicate that financial liberalization has a positive direct impact on bank 
TFP growth. We also find that liberalization leads to a higher propensity to banking crises, 
themselves, in turn, having a negative impact on bank TFP growth. However, in net terms, 
the positive bank TFP growth effect more than outweighs the negative one. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the 
methodology and data. Section 3 presents and discusses the results. Section 4 concludes.7 
                                                 
 
7 We refrain from adding a literature review section because a synthesis of previous studies beyond 
those already elaborated upon in our introduction would add little, and merely obfuscate the 
significance of the novel analysis underlying the present contribution. This is particularly so when 
acknowledging that while many studies have already investigated the specific mechanisms underlying 
the individual positive or negative effects of financial liberalization on bank productivity, none of 
them has developed an integrated framework to quantify the net effect, which constitutes the original 
endeavour of our empirical investigation. 
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2. Empirical methodology  
2.1. Measuring total factor productivity change 
There are two alternative ways of measuring TFP change of a production unit (or 
decision making unit), the parametric approach (as documented in Kumbhakar and Lovell, 
2003) and the nonparametric method (as in Coelli et al., 2005).  While there is no consensus 
on the ideal method,8 as both approaches have advantages and disadvantages, we opt for the 
nonparametric DEA-based Malmquist method, which is the one most commonly used to 
estimate the impact of deregulatory reforms in the banking sector.  The popularity of the 
DEA-based Malmquist method stems from its computational ease, and the fact that it does 
not rely on assumptions of economic behaviour such as cost minimization or profit 
maximization or any particular functional form for estimation.9  The limitation of this method 
is that – unlike the parametric approach – it cannot separate measurement errors and random 
noise from technical inefficiency but since in the present study we are not interested in testing 
specific hypotheses regarding the assembling components of bank TFP growth, the DEA-
based Malmquist method is fit for purpose. 
In order to derive bank TFP growth estimates, we follow Delis et al. (2011) who 
favour the output-oriented Malmquist method.10  Defined by Caves et al. (1982) and 
                                                 
8 Casu et al. (2004) compare the two methodologies and reveal broadly similar results in terms of 
identifying the components of productivity growth in European banking during the 1990s. 
 
9 Unlike the statistical regression method that tries to fit a regression plane through the data average, 
DEA uses linear programming techniques to float a piecewise linear surface to rest on top of the data. 
This means that while the regression method estimates the parameters in the assumed functional form 
by a single optimization over all the production units, DEA uses optimizations for different 
production units without a priori assumptions on the underlying functional forms. 
 
10 Coelli et al. (2005) suggest that the DEA linear programming technique does not suffer from 
statistical problems such as simultaneous equation bias, and so the choice of output or input 
orientation is not crucial.  In many instances, such a choice has only a minor influence upon the scores 
obtained (Coelli and Perelman, 1999).  Our results confirm this as the correlation obtained by 
comparing the TFP results using both output and input orientated approaches is close to 1. 
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estimated using DEA techniques by Fare et al. (1994), the Malmquist index expresses the 
change in TFP as: 
1
1 1 1 1 1 2
1 1
1
D ( , ) ( , )
( , , , )
( , ) ( , )
t t t t t t
t t t t
o t t t t t t
x y D x y
M x y x y
D x y D x y
    
 

 
  
 
 
where oM  refers to the productivity change from time t  to  t+1; and ( , )
t t tD x y  denotes the 
output distance to the production frontier under the production combination ( , )
t tx y at time t.  
A value of oM  greater than one indicates positive TFP growth while a value less than one 
indicates a decrease of TFP.   
As anticipated above, a virtue of the Malmquist index approach to productivity 
measurement is that it provides a computationally simple decomposition of TFP change 
(TFPCH) into technological change (TECH), which is associated with a shift in the best 
practice frontier, and technical efficiency change (TEFCH), which reflects the proximity of 
the sample banks to the frontier on average (the ‘catch-up’ effect).  This decomposition is 
useful in identifying the sources of changes in productivity (growth or disruptions) that may 
be linked to episodes of credit booms or crises during the period of investigation. As Isik and 
Hassan (2003a) show, the technical change component of TFPCH reflects technical progress 
if the production frontier shifts upward or technical regress if the frontier shifts downward. 
While the former may result from financial innovation or heightened competition, the latter 
may stem from a financial shock or crisis. 
 
2.2. The treatment effect model 
In order to examine the decomposed effect of financial liberalization (FL) on bank 
productivity growth, the Malmquist TFP growth scores serve as the dependent variable in the 
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estimation of a productivity growth model which includes a financial liberalization measure 
and a banking crisis dummy.  Furthermore, we treat the banking crisis dummy as an 
endogenous variable that depends on other variables including a financial liberalization 
indicator.  Thus we use an integrated model to assess the dual effects of financial 
liberalization, comprising a productivity growth equation as well as a crisis equation. 
The productivity growth equation has the following specification: 
, , , , , , , , ,                           (1)
crisis
i j t i j t j t j t j t t j i j ty X FL I M            
   
where , ,i j ty   is TFP growth of bank i that operates in country j at time t; ,j tFL  is a country 
level financial liberalization indicator; ,
crisis
j tI is a dummy variable taking value one if country j 
experienced a banking crisis in period t and zero otherwise.  Additionally, we account for 
bank level control variables ,i tX , country level control variables ,j tM , and year and country 
fixed effects t  and j , respectively. , ,i j t  is the random error term. 
 The crisis equation includes the banking crisis dummy ,
crisis
j tI  as an endogenous 
variable. ,
crisis
j tI depends on the realization of an unobserved latent variable 𝑊𝑗𝑡
∗  under the 
following conditions: 
                                                                                 (2) 
 
*
, , , ,b  j t j t j t j tW aZ FL   
  
The above equations (1) and (2) make up the integrated model that allows us to 
examine the decomposed effects of financial liberalization on bank productivity growth 
through a direct TFP growth channel, and an indirect banking crisis channel which captures 
the associated costs of banking crises in terms of lower productivity growth.  Like Ranciere et 
al. (2006) we assume that 
*
jtW  is a linear function of a set of control variables (covariates) 
*
,
,
1    0
0   
crisis j t
j t
if W
I
otherwise
 
 

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,j tZ , of the financial liberalization indicator ,j tFL , and of a random term ,  j t . Under ‘white 
noise’ assumption, i.e.,  ,   ~  0,1j t N , the crisis equation can be re–expressed as: 
   
   
*
, , ,
,
*
, , ,
1    : Pr 0          
0   : Pr 0 1
j t j t j t
crisis
j t
j t j t j t
with probability W aZ bFL
I
with probability W aZ bFL
    
 
   
 
where   denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. 
This transformation ensures that the fitted probabilities will lie between 0 and 1, making 
estimation of the parameters suitable through a probit model.  
 It is useful to point out that the mixed model made up by (1) and (2) above is 
analogous to a treatment effect model for which standard estimation techniques apply (see 
Heckman, 1978; and Maddala, 1983). The banking crisis dummy represents the ‘treatment’, 
the productivity growth regression (1) corresponds to the ‘outcome equation’, and regression 
(2) is the ‘treatment equation’ reflecting the probability of the effect of the treatment on the 
outcome. 
 Consistent estimation of the treatment effect model requires that the error terms 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡and 𝜑𝑖,𝑡 are bivariate normal, with a zero mean and a covariate term   of the resulting 
covariance matrix 
1
  
 
 
 equal to zero, implying independence of equations (1) and (2) (see, 
for example, Wooldridge, 2002). However, the highly restrictive assumption that the 
covariance term  will be zero may not be plausible and, if different from zero, estimation 
by OLS will tend to overestimate the treatment (Greene, 2000).  One way to address this 
problem is to employ the traditional two-step procedure suggested by Maddala (1983). This 
entails, in the first step, obtaining probit estimates of the probability of banking crises: 
    *, , ,Pr 1 Pr ( 0)  crisisj t jt j t j tI W aZ bFL    
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 Using the probit estimates ˆˆ( , )a b , a hazard ,j th  is then obtained for each j,t 
observation. In the second step, the productivity growth regression (1), i.e., the ‘outcome 
equation’, is estimated with the hazard added as an additional covariate so as to obtain 
consistent estimates for the parameters (α, β, γ, δ).  
 The total effect of financial liberalization on TFP growth is the sum of a direct effect 
and an indirect effect due to a change in the probability of a banking crisis: 
Total effect = ?̂?⏟
direct effect
+ 𝛾.𝐸{Φ(?̂?𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + ?̂?) − Φ(?̂?𝑍𝑗,𝑡)}⏟                  
indirect effect
       (3) 
where E{.} represents the (average) partial effect of financial liberalization on crisis 
probability. 
In this application, therefore, the protocol developed by Ranciere et al. (2006) allows 
us to estimate jointly the linear productivity growth regression model and the probit model of 
a banking crisis. Given the findings from the literature cited in our introduction, our a priory 
expectations are that the direct bank TFP growth effect is positive and the indirect effect – via 
a higher probability of a banking crisis – is negative. As for the net effect, this remains the 
crucial empirical question the present study aims to shed light on.  
  
2.3. Variables and data  
The above model is estimated using data from a sample of 1,530 commercial banks 
from 88 countries covering the period 1999-2011.  The chosen period is dictated by data 
availability and, given the similarity of production technology assumption implicit in our 
analysis, the sample is restricted to commercial banks only so as to ensure fair comparison of 
TFP estimates at cross-country level.  During the sample period, a major systemic banking 
crisis occurred in 2007-08 although there were other episodes of such crises, both in earlier 
and later years, which affected a handful of countries, such as Turkey (2000), Argentina 
(2001), Dominican Republic (2003) and Nigeria (2009).  According to the data from Laeven 
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and Valencia (2013), a total of 22 countries (out of 88 in our sample) were characterised as 
having reached systemic crisis proportions in 2011.  A typical feature of these crises is that 
they are preceded, in most cases, by credit booms normally associated with greater financial 
integration.   
Appendix A provides the list of countries in our sample, showing the number of banks 
as well as bank-year observations for each country, making up a total of 9,838 bank-year 
observations. Since there was significant growth in the number of banks over the sample 
period as well as numerous bank failures and mergers and acquisitions (M&As), we take 
account of these features in our empirical investigation by constructing an unbalanced panel 
to avoid selectivity bias.11  In Appendix A, we also indicate the start year for the countries 
which suffered a systemic banking crisis during the period.  
Descriptions of the sources of the variables employed in the empirical analysis are 
presented in Appendix B and the associated summary statistics are given in Table 1. All 
bank-level data were obtained from the balance sheets and income statements of commercial 
banks in the Bankscope database, and data for each individual bank were expressed in US 
million dollars for a given year, converted to 1995 prices (using country-specific GDP 
deflators). To ensure that our results are not driven by outliers, all the bank level data were 
“winsorized” at the 5% and 95% levels and, for a high degree of consistency, the data were 
also screened for reporting errors, inconsistencies and missing values. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
In calculating the Malmquist TFP index, we employ the widely accepted 
intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977) to select inputs and outputs, which 
                                                 
11 A balanced panel would impose the onerous requirement that banks exist throughout the 12 year 
period of our study, a hard challenge in turbulent markets.  To avoid the possibility of selection bias 
towards the “champions”, who are most likely to have survived during crises periods, we choose an 
unbalanced panel, which also accommodates for new entries, M&As and banks failures.   
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assumes that banks collect funds, using labor and physical capital, to transform them into 
various financial services and products.  Accordingly, following Delis et al. (2011) and 
others, we use three outputs: loans (LOAN), other earning assets (OEA), and non-interest 
income (NII). The three inputs to produce these outputs are: fixed assets to also account for 
property and equipment (FA), deposits and short-term funding (DSTF), and personnel 
expenses (PE). Lack of available data on stock values for labor, capital and off-balance sheet 
items implies that, as done in other cross-country studies (see, among others, Brissimis et al., 
2008; Delis et al., 2011; and Chortareas et al., 2013), we resort to using flow variables to 
represent these quantities.  
In estimating the dichotomous effect of financial liberalization (FL) using the 
treatment effect model, we account for two alternative, yet complementary, measures: a de 
jure indicator, as constructed by Chinn and Ito (2008), and a de facto indicator, as developed 
by Kose et al. (2009).12 The de jure indicator is constructed on the basis of the information 
published in the IMF Annual Report on the Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAER) to measure the intensity of capital market liberalization. The de facto 
indicator is computed from the ratio of sum of the gross stocks of foreign assets and liabilities 
to GDP and based on the work of Lane and Milesi–Ferretti (2007).13 Figure 1 depicts the 
                                                 
12 Well aware of the risks involved in opening the Pandora’s box of the whole set of measures covered 
by the use of the term ‘financial liberalization’, which are still the subject of debate, our use of both de 
jure and de facto measures of financial liberalization can nevertheless be said to capture the most 
salient features of the construct, namely, the freedom of finance to move into and out of an economy 
(proxied by capital account liberalization) and, as a result of deregulation of financial markets, the 
freedom of banks to pursue profits unhindered by government directives, including the removal of 
restrictions on the ownership of banks, leading to de-nationalisation and freedom for foreign 
ownership (proxied by the ratio of sum of the gross stocks of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP).  
  
13 Like Kose et al. (2009), Gehringer (2013) too argues that a de facto measure of liberalization is a 
more reliable indicator. Accordingly, following the approach of recent studies (e.g., Luo et al., 2016), 
we employ both measures for comprehensiveness and comparative purposes. Alternative (composite) 
measures of liberalization, based on Abiad et al. (2008), which have been used in several studies (e.g., 
Angkinand et al., 2010; Majerbi and Rachdi, 2014) are not available over a recent time period.  
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evolution of these variables (averaged across all countries in the sample), revealing a general 
increase in the pace of FL prior to the recent wave of the banking crisis in 2007-08, with a 
concomitant decline experienced in both de jure and de facto measures of FL after 2009. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 The data on banking crises is constructed by Laeven and Valencia (2008) but we use 
the updated dataset of Laeven and Valencia (2013), which includes information up to 2011 
(see also Laeven and Valencia, 2012). Chaudron and de Haan (2014) recently analyzed the 
robustness of three databases of banking crises in terms of their consistency in the 
identification and timing of crises and found that whilst there were large and statistically 
significant discrepancies between the three datasets, the database compiled by Laeven and 
Valencia, which is the one we use, proved to be the most accurate. This database identifies 
‘systemic banking crises’ defined as events in which there are both: (i) significant signs of 
financial distress (bank runs, bank losses, bank liquidation); and (ii) significant policy 
interventions in banking (liquidity support, bank restructuring, nationalizations, guarantees, 
asset purchases, deposit freeze, bank holiday). To capture the effect of systemic crises, we 
follow the practice adopted in previous studies (see, e.g., Kroszner et al., 2007; Dell'Ariccia 
et al., 2008; Cubillas et al., 2012; Fernández et al., 2013) by using a dummy variable which 
takes value 1 for three years, covering the year of inception of a crisis as reported by Laeven 
and Valencia (2013) and the two following years, and value 0 otherwise. As Isik and Hassan 
(2003b, p. 306) state, “Crisis is a fundamental event, whose sources might have formed in a 
long time period and whose impacts could persist many years after its occurrence”.14  
                                                 
14 In this framework, the likelihood of a crisis is therefore approximated by the latent variable model 
,
crisis
j tI = 1 (
*
jtW >0) for t = 1, 2, 3 following the onset of the systemic banking crisis in country j at time 
t (see Appendix B), 0 otherwise (including all countries that did not experience the crisis). 
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   A number of bank specific and country specific control variables are included in our 
model.  In the productivity growth equation, following prior studies that have examined bank 
TFP growth (see, e.g., Delis et al., 2011), we include a series of theory-based regressors that 
have sometimes been found to have explanatory power in its determination.  These include 
bank specific variables, such as equity over assets (EQAS) and the natural logarithm of real 
total assets (SIZE), as well as their squared terms (EQAS2 and SIZE2) to capture potential 
nonlinearities in their relationship with productivity growth. Regarding country specific 
controls we include real GDP growth (GDPG), inflation (INF), the level of financial 
development/depth (CLAIM), and a set of regulatory variables, obtained from the Barth et al. 
(2013) database, representing capital stringency requirements (CAPR), supervisory power 
(SUP), and market discipline (MARDIS).  Furthermore, we include a dummy variable 
(DEVEL) to account for differences between developed and developing countries in their 
level of economic development.  Finally, as a robustness check, we also account for 
differences in institutional development across countries. 
In the crisis equation, following Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1999), the 
canonical control variables include real GDP growth (GDPG), inflation (INF) and changes in 
the terms of trade (TOT CHANGE) to account for differences in economic and competitive 
conditions.  Furthermore, we add the three regulatory variables (CAPR, SUP and MARDIS) 
to establish their influence on the probability of crisis.  Additionally, we account for the 
influence of credit booms by including real domestic credit growth (CREDIT GRO) as a bank 
level control.  It should be noted that in order to avoid problems of weak identification (see, 
for example, Arellano, 2006), following Ranciere et al. (2006), two variables are excluded 
from the growth equation but are included in the crisis equation. These variables are changes 
in the terms of trade (TOT CHANGE) and real domestic credit growth (CREDIT GRO), 
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which prior studies have included as relevant covariates in determining the likelihood of 
banking crises (Ranciere et al, 2008; Fielding and Rewilak, 2015; Caballero, 2016).15   
 
 
3. Estimation results 
3.1. Stage 1 – TFP results 
Table 2 reports the geometric means of TFP growth estimates obtained using the 
intermediation approach.  These are measured relative to a common global frontier by 
pooling the data across all 88 countries, but presented as annualised averages and for the sub-
groups of 22 developed and 66 developing countries. Given our multi-country sample, we 
consider it appropriate to use a global frontier against which the productivity of each bank is 
assessed, the implied TFP growth estimates are then utilised in second-stage regressions 
where we control appropriately for bank level and country level differences.16  It should be 
noted that for each year the estimates are calculated relative to the previous year as the base 
year (i.e., using successive reference technologies).17  The last row presents the geometric 
mean of bank TFP growth for the whole period. As mentioned above, a value of the 
                                                 
15 The selection of the probit specification could be based on the Akaike information criterion by 
considering dynamic lags of all the country level variables included in the growth equation in addition 
to the excluded variables, as suggested by Ranciere et al. (2006).  Our approach, however, differs 
since we have bank-specific variables in the productivity growth equation and hence we follow prior 
studies in representing our choice, by including lags of those variables that, in addition to financial 
liberalization, are predicted to have explanatory power. 
 
16 We also considered the use of separate frontiers for developed and developing countries but found 
the results to be mostly unaffected as the Malmquist indices for these country groups are broadly 
similar to those of the combined sample, as confirmed by Spearman’s rho correlations of 0.8763 and 
0.8833, respectively, both statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 
17 The productivity change index requires that a bank included in the sample has survived for at least 
one previous year, which permits the use of an unbalanced panel.  As Table 2 shows, an average of 
644 banks are represented in the sample for the calculation of the Malmquist index, although there is a 
noticeable increase in the actual number of banks from 2002 to 2009, followed by a decline thereafter. 
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Malmquist index greater than one indicates positive TFP growth whereas a value less than 
one, denotes a decline in TFP. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
  The results in Table 2 indicate that for most of the years during the sample period, 
banks experienced positive TFP growth on average, consistent with banking systems 
worldwide benefiting from technological advances in globalised financial markets, the 
exception being the last two years which reveal a slight productivity decline.  The results for 
developed and developing country banks, however, exhibit slight differences in productivity 
changes over time. In particular, developed banking systems experienced productivity 
slowdown in the years 2000-01 and 2007-08. The former could be associated with the early 
2000s recession (when banks experienced efficiency losses) while the latter is likely to be 
linked to the onset of the systemic banking crisis (when banks suffered technical regress).  In 
contrast, developing country banks have experienced a productivity loss in the aftermath of 
the crisis, although the results indicate technical regress during 2007-08.   
 Overall, despite the marginal loss of productivity in some years, the results show an 
average productivity gain of 1.59% over the whole period, while the productivity gains for 
developed and developing country banks are 1.49% and 1.67%, respectively.  The evidence 
in favour of positive TFP growth is consistent with the pace of financial liberalization (and 
underlying financial reforms) sustained by most economies over the sample period, while the 
marginal decline in productivity observed in some years, particularly over the last two years, 
can be associated with systemic banking crises. However, a more formal investigation is 
warranted using a treatment effect model to attribute the positive and negative outcomes of 
bank TFP growth to the effects of financial liberalization and the associated banking crises.      
 
3.2. Stage 2 - main results 
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The second stage of our empirical analysis examines the decomposed effects of 
financial liberalization (FL) on bank productivity growth through a direct TFP growth 
channel, and an indirect effect stemming from the banking crisis channel. The indirect 
channel captures the higher likelihood of banking crises via FL and the associated costs in 
terms of lower productivity growth. 
 Table 3 reports the estimation results based on a TFP change and a crisis model 
estimated using 6,651 bank-year observations while allowing for country and year fixed 
effects.18 Panel A in Table 3 reports the results from the regression in which TFP change is 
the dependent variable and Panel B shows the results from the probit equation in which the 
systemic banking crisis dummy is the dependent variable. Specification [1] includes the de 
jure FL measure while specification [2] includes the de facto one. In each model standard 
errors are calculated using the heteroskedasticity robust cluster method with clustering at 
bank level (see Thompson, 2011).  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 The results in Panel A show that FL has a direct, positive and statistically significant 
effect (at the 1% level) on TFP growth in both specifications. The point estimates for two FL 
indicators are 0.0191 for the de jure measure and 0.0205 for the de facto measure. The results 
also indicate that a banking crisis has a negative and significant effect (at the 1% level) on 
TFP growth in both equations. The point estimates are -0.3806 (column [1]) and -0.3879 
(column [2]).  With regard to the control variables, bank capitalization (EQAS) is negatively 
and significantly related to TFP growth. In contrast, the impact of EQAS2 is positive and 
significant. These results suggest that, if starting from relatively high capital levels, a 
reduction in capital strength improves bank productivity.  
                                                 
18 Although the full sample includes 8,370 observations covering the period 1999-2010, the inclusion 
of dynamic lags in the probit specification inevitably reduces the number of observations available for 
estimation.  
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 With regard to the results reported in Panel B, financial liberalization positively and 
significantly increases the probability of banking crises (with point estimates 0.2473 for de 
jure and 0.1427 for de facto). The other control variables – GDP growth (GDPG) and credit 
growth (CREDIT GRO) – positively and significantly increase the probability of banking 
crises, while inflation (INF) is found to have the opposite effect. Among the regulatory 
variables, higher supervisory power (SUP) has a significant influence in reducing the 
probability of banking crises. 
Table 4 reports the decomposition of the effects of FL on bank TFP growth. As per a 
priori expectations, we find a positive direct bank TFP growth effect and a negative indirect 
effect – due to a higher probability of a banking crisis. The direct effect of FL on bank 
productivity is 1.91% for the de jure measure and 2.05% for the de facto measure. The 
corresponding indirect effects, computed by multiplying the point estimate of the crisis effect 
in the TFP growth equation by the average partial effect of FL on the crisis probability, are -
0.69% (de jure) and -0.41% (de facto).19  Although the indirect effects of FL on bank TFP 
growth cannot be directly benchmarked against previous studies (which have not employed 
this unique methodological framework), they seem plausible to us when considering that they 
specifically pertain to the deleterious impact on banking sector productivity of systemic 
banking crises. In interpreting the results of Table 4, our interest inevitably centres upon the 
(net) total effect. We find that the total (net) productivity growth effect of FL is positive, 
ranging from 1.22% in the de jure case to 1.64% under the de facto measure. We take the 
latter as the most reliable estimate.20  
                                                 
19 As the probit model is nonlinear, the partial effect of FL on crisis probability depends on the value 
of the other variables. The average partial effect (based on the formula specified in equation 3 above) 
is 0.01814 for de jure and 0.01056 for the de facto measure. Hence, the indirect productivity growth 
effects are, respectively: -0.3806*0.01814 = -0.0069 (de jure) and -0.3879*0.01056 = -0.0041 (de 
facto). 
 
20 Significant discrepancies between estimates of de jure vs. de facto measures are not uncommon 
since differences between the policy regimes reported, and those in place de facto, can be 
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[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
3.3. Robustness tests 
 In an attempt to address potential endogeneity concerns, as well as possible omitted 
variable or sample selection biases, we conduct a series of robustness checks in this section 
thereby verifying the sensitivity of the results to changes in the estimation method, model 
specification and sample size.   
A standard critique of OLS estimation (of the TFP growth model, in the present 
analysis) is that it captures a correlation that may in fact be driven by reverse causality – the 
possibility that higher productivity growth of banks attracts more foreign capital.  While it is 
difficult to establish how bank productivity growth could be linked to incentives explaining a 
country’s tendency to be financially more liberalized, or its higher propensity to systemic 
crises,21 we nevertheless address the potential reverse causality – and the associated 
endogeneity of financial liberalization and crises – by using two-stage least squares 
instrumental variables (2SLS-IV) estimation of the TFP growth model, combined with 
maximum likelihood estimation of the probit model (as before).  The instruments of the TFP 
growth regression, in this instance, are the lagged values of the explanatory variables in the 
probit model, which are confirmed as valid instruments by using a Sargan test for over-
identifying restrictions. 
                                                 
considerable, as is well documented in the literature also across a wider range of economy-wide 
policies reported by countries to the IMF, such as exchange rate regimes (see, e.g., Abbott et al., 
2012).  
 
21 It could be argued that more efficient or productive banks have larger foreign assets or liabilities 
because their home countries aim to maintain increased cross-border operations through trade (see 
Niepmann, 2015). Alternatively, it may be presumed that countries with more productive banks are 
less prone to banking crises owing to better regulatory systems.  These arguments, while not strictly 
implying that financial integration or crises are directly associated with bank productivity, make it 
apparent that reverse causality cannot be ruled out completely.   
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The results of this estimation are shown in Table 5, where we report only the 
estimates of the TFP growth model (since the probit results are the same as those in Table 4).  
Apart from a higher negative impact of banking crises and a higher positive impact of 
financial liberalization, the results are generally robust to this estimation method.  
Consequently, as reported in Table 6, the total net effect of FL on bank TFP growth remains 
positive (for both measures) although the direct and indirect effects are more pronounced 
compared to the values reported in Table 4.  These results indicate that the cyclical ‘boom-
bust’ impact on bank productivity growth is relatively stronger, although the net effect is 
slightly lower (higher) for the de jure (de facto) measure of FL. 
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 here] 
To investigate possible omitted variable bias, we consider two extensions of the TFP 
growth specification. In the first permutation, we allow for the influence of institutional 
environment by including a proxy for institutional quality. Following Kose et al. (2009), 
Bekaert et al. (2005, 2011) and others, this measure was constructed using data from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) - a monthly publication of Political Risk Services 
(PRS) – using three PRS indicators: corruption, rule of law, and bureaucratic quality (for 
explanations of these components, see Law et al., 2013). These indicators, the first two of 
which are scaled from 1 to 6 and the third from 1 to 4, were summed to obtain an overall 
proxy for institutional quality (INS), with higher values implying better institutional quality. 
The results, reported in Table 7, show a positive and significant effect of institutions on bank 
TFP growth.  Apart from the significance of the development dummy (DEVEL), the results 
with regard to other variables are robust to this change of specification. The significance of 
DEVEL confirms that banks in developing countries are more productive, after controlling 
for institutional quality, consistent with the findings from the DEA analysis which revealed 
higher average TFP growth of these banks. Significantly, in this extended specification, the 
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net effect of financial liberalization on bank productivity remains positive and almost 
identical to the values of Table 4. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
In the second permutation, following Ranciere et al. (2006), we include measures of 
credit growth (CREDIT GRO) and a change in the external terms of trade (TOT CHANGE) 
in the TFP growth model (1). Apart from a marginally positive the effect of credit growth on 
TFP growth, the main results obtained without these two measures survive in this 
specification (the results in this case are not reported to conserve space).  
Finally, although the two-stage estimation of the treatment effect model addresses the 
potential issue of sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979; Angkinand, 2009), following 
Cubillas and González (2014), we perform a check on the extent to which the dispersion in 
the number of banks per country may affect our main results. With this aim in mind, first, we 
eliminated 39 countries from the sample with less than 10 banks, including 2 countries 
(Ireland and Portugal) which suffered a systemic crisis in 2008. Second, we excluded 66 
countries with less than 100 observations, but this sub-sample of 22 countries still retained 11 
countries with systemic crises. In each case, due to the change in sample size, we re-
estimated both the probit and TFP growth regressions. The results, not shown to conserve 
space, are, once again, consistent with those obtained for the full sample (Table 3), hence 
offering further reassurances. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 This study examines the relationship between financial liberalization and bank-level 
productivity. We first use the Malmquist index to estimate the TFP growth of 1,530 banks 
operating in 88 countries between 1999 and 2011. Then, following the model employed by 
Ranciere et al. (2006), we use a treatment effect model to examine the decomposed impact of 
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financial liberalization on bank productivity growth into two channels: a direct bank TFP 
growth channel and an indirect productivity banking crises channel. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the decomposition of the effects of 
financial liberalization on bank TFP growth and the incidence of banking crises to quantify 
the net effect. 
Overall, our results confirm the findings of much of the previous literature which 
suggest that financial liberalization leads to a higher propensity to banking crises, which, in 
turn, affects bank productivity negatively. However, we unveil that, in net terms, financial 
liberalization has led to a faster average bank TFP growth, resulting in a positive net effect. In 
terms of the impact of control variables, bank capitalisation is found to have a significant 
influence on bank productivity growth whereas the country level influences (credit growth, 
terms of trade and regulations) operate indirectly through their impact on banking crises. Our 
results survive a battery of robustness tests catering for potential endogeneity and reverse 
causality concerns as well as possible omitted variable and sample selection biases. 
While our central purpose has been to quantify the net effect of financial liberalization 
on bank TFP growth, and not the underlying mechanisms through which liberalization affects 
productivity at the bank level, the literature highlights several possible channels through 
which productivity improvements may result from financial integration.  These include, for 
example, greater possibilities for enhanced capital allocation to productive investments, 
improved economies of scale and scope, reduced transaction, overhead and information costs, 
better quality and availability of financial services, new and more advanced technologies, in 
addition to indirect mechanisms which may operate through competition, financial depth or 
institutional development (see, for example, Levine, 2001; and Kose et al., 2009).  On the 
other hand, the crises-induced negative effects on productivity can be attributed to implicit 
costs stemming from consolidation or restructuring of banking operations (especially given 
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the decline in the number of banks from 2009 onwards), the consequences of which (as 
outlined in the introduction) are generally more widespread.  However, since these negative 
effects are likely to reign for a shorter period, and because crises occur rarely, the longer term 
net impact of financial liberalization on bank productivity could reasonably be expected to be 
positive, as confirmed by our empirical results. 
The main implication that flows from our findings concerns the policy debate about 
whether greater banking regulation (statutory, administrative as well as government’s 
discretionary ‘informal’ regulation) is needed to influence banking sector outcomes. We find 
that, under a liberalized financial regime, bank TFP growth and a more fragile banking 
system go hand in hand but, in net terms, and over a sufficiently long time span, the positive 
financial liberalization effect on bank TFP growth more than outweighs the indirect negative 
effect stemming from a higher propensity to systemic banking crises. Our findings, therefore, 
imply that limiting further banks’ operations in terms, for example, of more restrictive 
compliance and operational risk management in order to promote a more stable and less 
fragile banking system that is less susceptible to a systemic banking crisis, cannot be pursued 
without at least some costs for bank TFP growth. On this account, it should also be borne in 
mind that although banking crises are costly, and they can have significant economy-wide 
consequences, their occurrence remains a rare event (see, for example, Boissay et al., 2013). 
 Although we used both de jure and de facto measures of financial liberalization, 
future studies, particularly if interested in investigating the underlying channels contributing 
to the net effect unveiled (which were beyond the scope of this paper), could employ the 
recently developed more granular financial liberalization measure that reports capital controls 
separately for inflows and outflows and for different asset categories (see Fernández et al., 
2015).  Future work may also wish to use our analytical blueprint to investigate the net effect 
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of the dichotomous impact of financial liberalization on other bank performance measures, 
besides TFP growth. 
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Appendix A: Sample composition 
Country 
Number of 
Banks 
Number of 
Observations 
Systemic Banking Crisis 
(start year)  
Development 
Level 
Albania 3 18  Developing 
Algeria 8 40  Developing 
Argentina 45 165 2001 Developing 
Armenia 4 23  Developing 
Australia 10 26  Developed 
Austria 36 229 2008 Developed 
Bangladesh 14 111  Developing 
Belgium 18 73 2008 Developed 
Benin 5 31  Developing 
Bolivia 7 58  Developing 
Botswana 3 24  Developing 
Brazil 53 223  Developing 
Bulgaria 11 61  Developing 
Cameroon 7 42  Developing 
Canada 13 52  Developed 
Chile 2 6  Developing 
Colombia 20 91  Developing 
Costa Rica 14 72  Developing 
Cote d'Ivoire 6 31  Developing 
Croatia 27 207  Developing 
Cyprus 10 62  Developed 
Czech Republic 16 78  Developing 
Denmark 40 271 2008 Developed 
Dominican 
Republic 15 77 2003 Developing 
Ecuador 15 99  Developing 
El Salvador 8 44  Developing 
Estonia 6 28  Developed 
Ethiopia 6 49  Developing 
Finland 3 8  Developed 
France 77 487 2008 Developed 
Georgia 7 40  Developing 
Germany 70 412 2008 Developed 
Guatemala 2 19  Developing 
Guyana 2 21  Developing 
Honduras 14 53  Developing 
China 16 37  Developing 
Hungary 15 102 2008 Developing 
India 53 415  Developing 
Indonesia 47 260  Developing 
Ireland 3 6 2008 Developed 
Israel 8 76  Developed 
Italy 66 206 2008 Developed 
Japan 6 19  Developed 
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Jordan 10 96  Developing 
Kazakhstan 17 96 2008 Developing 
Kenya 19 97  Developing 
Kuwait 5 51  Developing 
Latvia 13 65 2008 Developing 
Lithuania 9 62  Developing 
Madagascar 3 14  Developing 
Malawi 2 19  Developing 
Malaysia 24 115  Developing 
Mali 4 25  Developing 
Malta 2 26  Developed 
Mauritius 6 30  Developing 
Mexico 4 4  Developing 
Moldova 9 40  Developing 
Morocco 4 18  Developing 
Mozambique 3 24  Developing 
Nepal 10 62  Developing 
Netherlands 18 63 2008 Developed 
Niger 3 12  Developing 
Nigeria 22 68 2009 Developing 
Pakistan 18 97  Developing 
Panama 19 110  Developing 
Paraguay 9 78  Developing 
Peru 10 76  Developing 
Philippines 20 76  Developing 
Poland 17 76  Developing 
Portugal 8 22 2008 Developed 
Romania 19 105  Developing 
Saudi Arabia 9 104  Developing 
Senegal 8 51  Developing 
Singapore 4 14  Developed 
Slovenia 12 116 2008 Developed 
South Africa 5 20  Developing 
Spain 21 55 2008 Developed 
Sri Lanka 9 42  Developing 
Sweden 13 84 2008 Developed 
Switzerland 82 642 2008 Developed 
Thailand 15 101  Developing 
Tunisia 12 59  Developing 
Turkey 16 67 2000 Developing 
United 
Kingdom 46 219 2007 Developed 
United States 114 487 2007 Developed 
Venezuela 22 130  Developing 
Vietnam 17 45  Developing 
Zambia 7 55  Developing 
Note: Total sample is 1,530 banks from 88 countries (686 from 22 developed and 844 from 66 developing countries).
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Appendix B: Variable descriptions and data sources.  
Variables Description Source 
Stage 1: DEA Malmquist index  
A. Bank inputs   
Fixed assets (FA) Assets related to physical capital. BankScope 
Deposits and short-
term funding 
(DSTF) 
Incoming funds used to generate bank 
outputs. 
BankScope 
Personnel expenses 
(PE) 
Including wages and salaries, social security 
costs, pension expenses and other personnel 
costs. 
BankScope 
B. Bank outputs  BankScope 
Loans (LOAN) Bank gross loans net of reserves for 
impaired loans. 
BankScope 
Other earning 
assets (OEA) 
Including securities and investment income. BankScope 
Non-interest 
income (NII) 
Net gains from trading, insurance, fees and 
commissions, and non-banking business. 
BankScope 
Stage 2: Treatment effect model  
De jure financial 
liberalization (De 
jure FL) 
A policy based measure of capital account 
liberalization. On a scale of 0-4, higher 
implies more openness of the countries’ 
capital account transactions. 
Chinn and Ito (2008) 
De facto financial 
liberalization (De 
facto FL) 
The ratio of sum of the gross stocks of 
foreign assets and liabilities to GDP 
Kose et al. (2009);  
Lane and Milesi–
Ferretti (2007) 
Ratio of equity to 
total assets (EQAS) 
Proxy for bank capitalization, with EQAS2 
representing its squared value. 
BankScope 
Logarithm of total 
assets (SIZE) 
Proxy for bank size, with SIZE2 
representing its squared value. 
BankScope 
GDP growth 
(GDPG ) 
Real GDP growth (per cent) Global Market 
Information Database 
(GMID) 
Inflation ( INF ) CPI inflation rate (per cent). GMID 
Ratio of claims to 
banking sector over 
GDP (CLAIM) 
Proxy for the development of the banking 
sector.  
GMID 
Systemic banking 
crises  (CRISIS) 
Systemic banking crises dummy, which 
takes the value 1 in the year that the crisis 
occurs in a country and for 2 years after, 0 
otherwise. 
Author’s calculations 
using data from 
Laeven and Valencia 
(2012, 2013) 
Credit growth 
(CREDIT GRO) 
Real domestic credit growth (per cent). World Economic 
Outlook 
Terms of trade 
change (TOT 
CHANGE)  
Change in the terms of trade. World Economic 
Outlook 
Capital 
requirements 
(CAPR) 
Index of capital requirements, measuring 
both initial and overall capital stringency. 
On a scale of 0-10, larger values indicate 
more stringent capital regulation. 
Barth et al. (2013) 
Supervisory power 
(SUP) 
Index of official supervisory power, ranging 
from 0 to 14, which captures the power of 
supervisors to take prompt corrective action, 
to restructure and reorganize troubled banks, 
Barth et al. (2013) 
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and to declare a troubled bank insolvent. 
Higher values indicate greater power of 
supervisors. 
Market discipline 
(MARDIS) 
Index of market discipline, ranging from 0-
12, which captures the degree to which 
banks are required to release accurate and 
comprehensive information to the public.  
Higher values indicate greater regulatory 
empowerment of the monitoring of banks by 
private investors. 
Barth et al. (2013) 
Institutional 
Quality (INS) 
Sum of the index of corruption (scaled 1 to 
6), rule of law (1 to 6), and bureaucratic 
quality (1 to 4). 
International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) 
Development 
(DEVEL) 
Country dummy taking value 0 for 
developed, and 1 for developing. 
IMF 
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Table 1  
Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A: Bank inputs and outputs (1998 to 2011)  
Inputs      
FA 8,878 53.1000 91.2900 1.0000 646.0000 
DSTF 8,878 3,478.4800 5822.0000 1.0000 49,546.0000 
PE 8,878 53.9100 84.0700 1.0000 644.0000 
Outputs      
LOAN 8,878 2,591.3200 4,758.1400 1.0000 38,605.0000 
OEA 8,878 1,396.4300 2,594.3400 1.0000 20,676.0000 
NII 8,878 69.6900 115.4800 1.0000 943.0000 
Panel B : Second stage variables (1999 to 2011) 
TFPCH 8,370 1.0160 0.1900 0.1350 6.4410 
De jure FL 8,370 1.2511 1.4519 -1.8639 2.4390 
De facto FL 8,370 3.3319 4.5323 0.3660 75.7574 
EQAS 8,370 0.1073 0.0703 0.0015 0.9166 
SIZE 8,370 7.3617 1.4991 2.9957 11.0191 
GDPG 8,370 3.3292 3.7759 -17.7000 21.2000 
INF 8,370 4.5914 4.9824 -8.2000 52.4000 
CLAIM 8,370 82.6595 55.9029 3.7250 315.4940 
CRISIS 8,370 0.0436 0.2042 0.0000 1.0000 
CREDIT GRO 8,370 85.5442 60.3468 3.8401 296.4590 
TOT CHANGE 8,370 -0.7963 9.8038 -66.8040 102.1260 
CAPR 8,370 6.7943 1.7203 2.0000 10.0000 
SUP 8,370 11.2841 2.3350 4.0000 14.0000 
MARDIS 8,370 8.0536 1.4105 4.0000 11.0000 
INS 8,207 10.2200 3.2573 3.0000 16.0000 
DEVEL 8,370 0.5600 0.4964 0.0000 1.0000 
Note: The table reports summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. FA 
represents fixed assets; DSTF stands for deposits and short-term funding; PE is personnel expenses; 
LOAN refers to loans; OEA refers to other earning assets; NII refers to non-interest income; TFPCH 
represents bank total factor productivity growth; De jure FL corresponds to the de jure measure of 
financial liberalization; De facto FL corresponds to de facto financial liberalization; EQAS is the ratio 
of equity to total assets; SIZE represents the logarithm of total assets; GDPG refers to real GDP 
growth; INF denotes the CPI inflation rate; CLAIM refers to the ratio of claims to banking sector over 
GDP; CRISIS corresponds to systemic banking crises; CREDIT GRO refers to real domestic credit 
growth; TOT CHANGE refers to terms of trade change; CAPR is a proxy for capital requirements; 
SUP is a measure of official supervisory power; MARDIS refers to the index of market discipline; INS 
is an indicator of institutional quality; and DEVEL is a dummy variable to denote the state of economic 
development (1= developing; 0 = developed). 
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Table 2  
Bank total factor productivity growth (TFPCH) and decomposition 
Year 
No. of 
Banks 
Malmquis
t index 
(TFPCH) 
Technical 
change 
(TECH) 
Efficienc
y change 
(TEFCH) 
No. of 
Banks 
Malmquis
t index 
(TFPCH) 
Technical 
change 
(TECH) 
Efficienc
y change 
(TEFCH) 
No. of 
Banks 
Malmquist 
index 
(TFPCH)) 
Technical 
change 
(TECH) 
Efficiency 
change 
(TEFCH) 
 All countries 
  
Developed countries 
Developing 
countries 
  
1999 489 1.0164 1.0592 0.9714 243 1.0119 1.0558 0.971 246 1.0209 1.0625 0.9718 
2000 334 1.0154 1.0086 1.0086 180 1.0227 1.0173 1.007 154 1.0068 0.9985 1.0105 
2001 315 1.0003 1.0886 0.9208 178 0.9859 1.0606 0.9311 137 1.0191 1.1251 0.9075 
2002 336 1.0453 0.8363 1.2717 173 1.0103 0.8691 1.1869 163 1.0824 0.8015 1.3618 
2003 608 1.0327 0.8947 1.1661 264 1.0314 0.9078 1.147 344 1.0337 0.8846 1.1807 
2004 655 1.0363 1.0776 0.9766 283 1.0463 1.0495 1.013 372 1.0286 1.099 0.949 
2005 674 1.0146 1.0030 1.0208 287 1.0224 0.9864 1.0431 387 1.0089 1.0152 1.0043 
2006 714 1.0273 1.1147 0.9385 296 1.034 1.1057 0.9502 418 1.0225 1.1211 0.9302 
2007 833 1.0122 1.0799 0.9484 327 1.0217 1.0719 0.9655 506 1.0062 1.085 0.9373 
2008 941 1.0026 0.8402 1.2051 400 0.9863 0.8367 1.1896 541 1.0145 0.8428 1.2165 
2009 977 1.0232 1.1984 0.8665 398 1.022 1.1534 0.9039 579 1.0240 1.2293 0.8407 
2010 744 0.9955 1.0840 0.9255 328 1.0046 1.0911 0.9297 416 0.9884 1.0785 0.9221 
2011 750 0.9994 0.9618 1.0459 326 0.9960 0.9682 1.0384 424 1.0020 0.9568 1.0516 
Mean 644 1.0159 1.0262 1.0131 283 1.0149 1.0165 1.0191 361 1.0167 1.0338 1.0084 
Note: The mean scores of the total factor productivity change (TFPCH) index and its components, technical change (TECH) and efficiency change (TEFCH) for all countries, 
developed countries, and developing countries.  TFPCH = TECH*TEFCH.  The table indicates the number of banks accounted for in the calculation of TFPCH for each year.  
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Table 3 
Financial liberalization, crisis and bank TFP growth (OLS estimation) 
 [1] [2]  
 De jure FL De facto FL 
Panel A: Bank TFP growth equation (dependent variable: TFPCH) 
FL 0.0191** 0.0205** 
 (0.0095) (0.0095) 
EQAS -0.3598*** -0.3500*** 
 (0.1164) (0.1166) 
EQAS2 0.8492*** 0.8366*** 
 (0.2354) (0.2369) 
SIZE -0.0118 -0.0103 
 (0.0154) (0.0150) 
SIZE2 0.0007 0.0006 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) 
GDPG 0.0014 0.0016 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) 
INF -0.0015 -0.0021** 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) 
CLAIM 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
CAPR 0.0026 0.0029 
 (0.0021) (0.0022) 
SUP -0.0016 -0.0014 
 (0.0016) (0.0016) 
MARDIS 0.0009 0.0003 
 (0.0020) (0.0021) 
DEVEL 0.0405 0.0293 
 (0.0524) (0.0480) 
CRISIS -0.3806*** -0.3879*** 
 (0.1354) (0.1356) 
First step hazard (Lambda) 0.1739** 0.1739*** 
 (0.0678) (0.0674) 
   
Panel B: Crisis (probit) equation (Dependent variable: CRISIS)  
FL 0.2473*** 0.1427*** 
 (0.0400) (0.0389) 
GDPG (lag) 0.0894*** 0.0798*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0120) 
INF (lag) -0.0385*** -0.0557*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0143) 
CREDIT GRO (lag) 0.0051*** 0.0053*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) 
TOT CHANGE (lag) 0.0137*** 0.0103** 
 (0.0050) (0.0048) 
CAPR (lag) 0.0223 0.0032 
 (0.0206) (0.0196) 
SUP (lag) -0.0698*** -0.0710*** 
 (0.0135) (0.0132) 
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MARDIS (lag) -0.0191 -0.0191 
 (0.0242) (0.0240) 
Rho 0.8765 0.8750 
Sigma 0.1985 0.1988 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes 
Number of observations 6651 6651 
Note: The TFP growth estimation includes year and country fixed effects, with robust standard errors clustered at the 
bank level (reported in parentheses). Panel A reports the results from the regression in which bank productivity change 
(TFPCH) is the dependent variable. Panel B shows the results from the probit equation in which bank crisis dummy 
(CRISIS) is the dependent variable. The control variables in this equation enter with one-period lag. ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Specification [1] includes the de jure financial 
liberalization measure (De jure FL), while specification [2] includes the de facto one (De facto FL). EQAS is the ratio of 
equity to total assets (with EQAS2 representing its squared value); SIZE represents the logarithm of total assets (with 
SIZE2 its squared value); GDPG refers to real GDP growth; INF denotes the CPI inflation rate; CLAIM refers to the 
ratio of claims to banking sector over GDP; CRISIS corresponds to systemic banking crises; CREDIT GRO refers to real 
domestic credit growth; TOT CHANGE refers to terms of trade change; CAPR is a proxy for capital requirements; SUP 
is a measure of official supervisory power; MARDIS refers to the index of market discipline; and DEVEL is a dummy 
variable to denote the state of economic development (1= developing; 0 = developed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Decomposition of the effects of financial liberalization on bank TFP growth.  
 De jure FL  De facto FL 
Direct productivity growth effect +1.91% +2.05% 
Indirect productivity growth effect -0.69% -0.41% 
Total productivity growth effect +1.22% +1.64% 
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Table 5  
Financial liberalization, crisis and bank TFP growth (Probit-2SLS estimation). 
 [1]  [2]  
 De jure FL De facto FL 
Dependent variable: Bank TFP growth (TFPCH) 
FL 0.0212*** 0.0285*** 
 (0.0074) (0.0078) 
EQAS -0.3755*** -0.3633*** 
 (0.0895) (0.0892) 
EQAS2 0.8666*** 0.8524*** 
 (0.1537) (0.1537) 
SIZE -0.0130 -0.0098 
 (0.0158) (0.0158) 
SIZE2 0.0008 0.0006 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) 
GDPG 0.0018* 0.0020* 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) 
INF -0.0015* -0.0023*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0008) 
CLAIM 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
CAPR 0.0023 0.0024 
 (0.0027) (0.0028) 
SUP -0.0029 -0.0029 
 (0.0022) (0.0022) 
MARDIS 0.0004 -0.0006 
 (0.0031) (0.0031) 
DEVEL 0.0203 0.0114 
 (0.0604) (0.0572) 
CRISIS -0.6773*** -0.7969*** 
 (0.2078) (0.2387) 
First step hazard (Lambda) 0.3102*** 0.3620*** 
 (0.0957) (0.1100) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes 
Wald (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 
Sargan (p-value) 0.2923 0.4894 
Number of observations 6,651 6,651 
Note: The TFP growth estimation includes year and country fixed effects, with robust standard errors clustered at bank 
level (reported in parentheses).  Probit results (not reported) are the same as in Table 3. Wald is a test indicating 
goodness of fit of the regression. Sargan is a test for over-identifying restrictions. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.  Specification [1] includes the de jure financial liberalization measure 
(De jure FL), while specification [2] includes the de facto one (De facto FL). EQAS is the ratio of equity to total assets 
(with EQAS2 representing its squared value); SIZE represents the logarithm of total assets (with SIZE2 its squared 
value); GDPG refers to real GDP growth; INF denotes the CPI inflation rate; CLAIM refers to the ratio of claims to 
banking sector over GDP; CRISIS corresponds to systemic banking crises; CAPR is a proxy for capital requirements; 
SUP is a measure of official supervisory power; MARDIS refers to the index of market discipline; and DEVEL is a 
dummy variable to denote the state of economic development (1= developing; 0 = developed). 
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Table 6 
Decomposition of the effects of financial liberalization on bank TFP growth.  
 De jure FL  De facto FL 
Direct productivity growth effect +2.12% +2.85% 
Indirect productivity growth effect -1.23% -0.84% 
Total productivity growth effect +0.89% +2.01% 
 
 
Table 7  
Financial liberalization, crisis and bank TFP growth (Controlling for institutional quality). 
 [1]  [2]  
 De jure FL De facto FL 
Dependent variable: Bank TFP growth (TFPCH) 
FL 0.0194** 0.0263** 
 (0.0098) (0.0111) 
EQAS -0.3803*** -0.3735*** 
 (0.1170) (0.1171) 
EQAS2 0.8756*** 0.8674*** 
 (0.2363) (0.2380) 
SIZE -0.0163 -0.0142 
 (0.0157) (0.0152) 
SIZE2 0.0010 0.0008 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) 
GDPG 0.0010 0.0012 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) 
INF -0.0017 -0.0023** 
 (0.0012) (0.0011) 
CLAIM 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
CAPR 0.0015 0.0015 
 (0.0022) (0.0022) 
SUP -0.0019 -0.0017 
 (0.0016) (0.0016) 
MARDIS -0.0001 -0.0012 
 (0.0022) (0.0023) 
DEVEL 0.1084* 0.1206* 
 (0.0647) (0.0648) 
INS 0.0084* 0.0100** 
 (0.0043) (0.0043) 
CRISIS -0.3757*** -0.3934*** 
 (0.1371) (0.1375) 
First step hazard (Lambda) 0.1701** 0.1752** 
 (0.0687) (0.0684) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes 
Number of observations 6,518 6,518 
Note: The TFP growth estimation includes year and country fixed effects, with robust standard errors clustered at the 
bank level (reported in parentheses). Probit results (not reported) are the same as in Table 3.  ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Specification [1] includes the de jure financial 
liberalization measure (De jure FL), while specification [2] includes the de facto one (De facto FL). EQAS is the ratio of 
equity to total assets (with EQAS2 representing its squared value); SIZE represents the logarithm of total assets (with 
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SIZE2 its squared value); GDPG refers to real GDP growth; INF denotes the CPI inflation rate; CLAIM refers to the 
ratio of claims to banking sector over GDP; CRISIS corresponds to systemic banking crises; CAPR is a proxy for capital 
requirements; SUP is a measure of official supervisory power; MARDIS refers to the index of market discipline; INS is 
an indicator of institutional quality; and DEVEL is a dummy variable to denote the state of economic development (1= 
developing; 0 = developed). 
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Figure 1: Evolution of the de jure and de facto measures of financial liberalization.  
 
Note: De jure FL corresponds to the de jure measure of financial liberalization, constructed on the basis of the 
information published in the IMF annual report on the Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) to 
capture the degree of capital market liberalization. De facto FL corresponds to the de facto measure of financial 
liberalization, computed from the ratio of sum of the gross stocks of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP, based on Lane 
and Milesi–Ferretti (2007). The vertical axis denotes the scale of computed country-year averages for both measures. 
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